


SAC Highlights Award


仿效熟知之物：一种针对LLM工具学习系统信息窃取攻击的动态指令生成方法

江子攸, 李明阳*, 杨国伟, 王俊杰, 黄悦凯, 常志远, 王青*

ACL 2025 联系人: 江子攸 ziyou2019@iscas.ac.cn

1. Background & Motivation


With the development of LLM agents, information-theft attacks pose a significant risk to LLM tool-learning systems. Some Adversaries may inject malicious commands through compromised tools, manipulating LLMs to send sensitive information to these tools. However, two challenges remains:

1.1 Challenges


- **Challenge-1:** Attack approaches are black-box.
- **Challenge-2:** It rely on static commands that cannot adapt flexibly to the changes in toolchains.

1.2 Contribution

- **AutoCMD**, a red-teaming approach that dynamically construct commands for black-box systems.
- **Defense Method** for the AutoCMD's attack results.



2. Methodology



2.1 AttackDB Preparation

- **Goal:** Learning key information from open-source systems that relate to the information-theft attack.
- **Attack:** Collect $\mathcal{T}_{vict}^A, \mathcal{T}_{att}^A$, then inject the command into open-source systems.
- **AttackDB:** Five-array Tuple $\langle \mathcal{T}_{vict}^A, \mathcal{T}_{att}^A, C^A, R^A, G^A \rangle$.


2.2 Mimicking the Familiar

- **Goal:** Using key information in AttackDB to design targeted commands and attack black-box system.
- **Rewards:** Info-theft Rewards & Sentiment Score.
- **RL Optimization:** $\mathcal{L}_{gen} = \mathbb{E}_{[C_{1:m}^O] \sim f_{gen}} [-\eta \log P_{gen}(C^O | G, \mathcal{T}_{att}^O) \cdot r(E_i)]$

3. Experiment Results

3.1 Performance of AutoCMD

Target System	Approaches	Livid's Info-Theft Attack			Ovid's Info-Theft Attack			Average Result		
		IER \downarrow	TSR \uparrow	ASR $_{Theft}\uparrow$	IER \downarrow	TSR \uparrow	ASR $_{Theft}\uparrow$	IER \downarrow	TSR \uparrow	ASR $_{Theft}\uparrow$
Evaluation on Open-Source LLM Tool-Learning System										
ToolBench	PoisonParam	77.8	21.0	16.4	52.2	57.4	55.0	65.0	39.2	35.7
	FixedCMD	40.6	55.2	53.2	67.3	59.2	58.8	54.0	57.2	56.0
	FixedDBCMD	49.7	60.2	57.2	49.6	61.5	60.1	49.7	60.9	58.7
	AUTOCMD	44.1	73.9	72.4	39.5	72.6	71.4	41.8	73.3	71.9
ToolEyes	PoisonParam	69.2	60.9	57.9	66.5	59.2	46.0	67.9	60.1	52.0
	FixedCMD	99.0	75.2	46.8	94.5	80.7	54.7	96.8	78.0	50.8
	FixedDBCMD	47.2	78.5	70.2	67.5	88.5	60.2	57.4	83.5	65.2
	AUTOCMD	30.5	81.3	80.9	23.7	85.5	83.9	27.1	83.4	82.4
AutoGen	PoisonParam*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	FixedCMD	80.5	89.5	20.2	97.7	97.7	0.0	89.1	93.6	10.1
	FixedDBCMD	66.3	76.7	64.3	67.2	97.7	42.6	66.8	87.2	53.5
	AUTOCMD	42.9	94.5	91.5	50.2	95.7	84.9	46.6	95.1	88.2
Evaluation on Black-Box LLM Tool-Learning System										
LangChain	FixedCMD	63.8	74.5	25.5	44.7	85.1	55.3	54.3	79.8	40.4
	FixedDBCMD	34.0	63.8	34.0	40.4	91.5	66.0	37.2	77.7	50.0
	AUTOCMD	4.3	74.5	74.5	2.1	93.6	93.6	3.2	84.0	84.0
KwaiAgents	FixedCMD	76.6	76.6	0.0	51.1	51.1	0.0	63.8	63.8	0.0
	FixedDBCMD	55.3	59.6	2.1	70.2	85.1	8.5	62.8	72.3	5.3
	AUTOCMD	34.0	89.4	85.1	6.4	97.9	95.7	20.2	93.6	90.4
QwenAgent	FixedCMD	55.3	78.7	63.8	61.7	70.2	55.3	58.5	74.5	59.6
	FixedDBCMD	23.4	53.2	36.2	34.0	42.6	40.4	28.7	47.9	38.3
	AUTOCMD	6.4	83.0	76.6	19.1	95.7	85.1	12.8	89.4	80.9



3.2 Defense Methods of AutoCMD

Target System	Defense Methods	IER	TSR	ASR $_{Theft}$
ToolBench	w/o Defense	41.8	73.3	71.9
	w/ InferCheck	43.5 (↑1.7)	50.5 (↓22.8)	20.6 (↓51.3)
	w/ ParamCheck	50.6 (↑8.8)	62.8 (↓10.5)	18.3 (↓53.6)
	w/ DAST	54.4 (↑12.6)	55.9 (↓17.4)	7.3 (↓64.6)
ToolEyes	w/o Defense	27.1	83.4	82.4
	w/ InferCheck	46.2 (↑19.1)	88.0 (↑4.6)	66.4 (↓16.0)
	w/ ParamCheck	51.5 (↑24.4)	54.1 (↓29.3)	16.5 (↓65.9)
	w/ DAST	30.5 (↑3.4)	26.4 (↓57.0)	1.7 (↓80.7)
AutoGen	w/o Defense	46.6	95.1	88.2
	w/ InferCheck	51.3 (↑4.7)	95.1 (0.0)	80.3 (↓7.9)
	w/ ParamCheck	62.8 (↑16.2)	90.4 (↓4.7)	73.5 (↓14.7)
	w/ DAST	40.1 (↓6.5)	42.8 (↓52.3)	2.7 (↓85.5)

